BAE Systems recently unveiled a proposal to add additional VLS cells to the Hunter class frigates being built for the Royal Australian Navy. Here we examine the background to the requirement for more missiles and the potential opportunities for Type 26 customer nations.
Up arming down under
The Australian Defence Strategic Review (DSR) concluded that the country needs to change from its reactive posture and adopt a more proactive strategy intended to defeat potential threats further away from its northern coast. In naval terms, this will require “an enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet, that complements a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet, is now essential given our changed strategic circumstances.”
The nine Type 26 derivative Hunter-class frigates that are about to start construction are intended primarily for anti-submarine warfare, arguably the finest ASW combatant design available in the world right now. The last three Australian Defence White Papers had emphasised ASW as submarines continue to proliferate in the Asia-Pacific region. Subsequent to selecting the Hunter design, the RAN has started down the long road to acquisition of SSNs which will eventually increase ASW capability significantly. Critics in Australia see the future fleet as having too great an emphasis on defence against underwater threats and a lack of offensive capability, especially in the form of anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles. (An echo of the complaint that Royal Navy warships are “like porcupines – well-defended herbivores with limited offensive capabilities”.)
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has even called for the Hunter order to be reduced from 9 ships to 6 because the current plans “would result in an ‘unbalanced’ fleet biased towards ASW… In addition to the Hobart class [3 x AAW destroyers], the remaining ships should be replaced by multipurpose frigates or destroyers with greater missile capacity to support the DSR requirement of impactful projection”. The RAN is conducting a review of its surface fleet which will be published in 2024 and will set out how it may be reconfigured to meet the changing strategic goals. As the frigate program, along with a new class of corvettes, are the centrepieces of the future fleet, plans for the Hunter class are likely to evolve in some direction. In the meantime at the recent Indo-Pacific Naval Maritime Expo in Sydney, various manufacturers were scrambling to show off new heavily armed combatant designs ranging from OPVs with anti-ship missiles to corvettes and frigates groaning with VLS cells and weapon canisters.
Despite the Hunter class being the best solution for the core requirements originally set by the RAN, the programme has been the subject of criticism and attempts to undermine it. Navantia even went directly to the Commonwealth government offering to build a second batch of ASW-oriented Hobarts (based on a 20-year-old hull) claiming they could be in the water before the first Hunter. Delays to starting Hunter construction have mainly centred around the additional top weight of the CEAFAR-2 modular active phase array radar antenna. Significantly superior to the Artisan of the RN Type 26, the domestically-developed CEAFAR was specified as the RAN wants increased anti-air warfare capability for its prime ASW combatants.
An additional 18-month postponement to cutting steel was agreed by all parties in 2021 due to COVID and the complexity of RAN-specific changes including the radar and combat system. To address the topweight issue, the beam will be increased by 0.6m over the reference design. Even small changes to the dimensions of a ship involve significant recalculation and work for the naval architects. However, the delay is undoubtedly beneficial to industry allowing more time for the Osborne shipyard to develop, work on prototypes and build up workforce skills which should make for more efficient construction in the long run. BAES are confident the programme is on track, the first 3 Hunters are on contract and likely to be delivered as planned.
Cell multiplication
As currently configured, the Hunter class have a 32-cell Mk 41 VLS forward. (The RN’s Type 26 is fitted with 24 Mk 41 cells and 2 x 24-cell Sea Ceptor VLS) At least initially, the Hunters are expected to fill these cells with air defence missiles in the form of the Raytheon Standard SM-2 (which could be replaced with much-improved SM-6) and ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile) Block II missiles. The SM-2 provides area air defence capability (out to approx 150km). The ESSM is essentially a shorter-range weapon (out to approx 50km) but can be quad-packed into a single MK 41 cell. The Mk 41 is highly flexible and there are several other compatible effectors available such as Tomahawk or ASROC (and eventually the European FCASW), should the customer select them. The Hunters will have the Lockheed Martin Aegis combat management system, although SAAB Australia will develop the interface between Aegis and the non-US weapons and sensors.
At Indo-Pac Expo BAE Systems revealed its Guided Missile Frigate (GMF) variant of the Hunter class with an additional 64 Mk 41 VLS cells replacing the central mission bay, taking the total complement to 96. The VLS count is flexible and 48 or 64 could be added depending on the requirement. BAES says that if the RAN really wanted to go ‘all in’ and elect to remove the 5-inch Mk 45 gun, a total of 128 cells could be added which surpasses even the USN Ticonderoga class cruisers.
Removing the gun is unlikely as in the age of the cheap swarming drone. Combined with modern advanced munitions, naval gunnery is making a comeback as a counter to uncrewed air and surface craft too small or numerous to be engaged with expensive missiles. The USS Carney recently destroyed UAVs launched by Houthi Rebels in the Red Sea using her Mk 45 gun. BAES Weapon Systems division in the US already has a contract with the RAN for the manufacture of Mk 45 guns and their Automated Handling Systems (AHS) for delivery between 2023-36.
Swapping out
The advantage of this proposal to modify the Hunter class is that the impact on the existing platform would be relatively modest and avoids the time and expense of a complete re-design. BAES say that 85% of the GMF variant would retain commonality with the original and they have been in discussions with the RAN for about a year on how to move away from its purely ASW focus. Most critically, the company says it would be possible to deliver either all or some of the later ships modified in this way without affecting the overall cost or delivery timetable.
The Type 26 reference design is engineered to extremely high standards of acoustic hygiene for ASW reasons but this is a significant cost driver. A low signature and general-purpose capability is always desirable but it may be that some quietening compromises could be made and the towed array sonar removed to reduce cost and keep the GMF within the original budget envelope. Removing the Flexible Mission Space (FMS) saves on the expense of the mission bay handling system (MBHS) and some of the plug-in infrastructure built to support equipment while in the bay. However, this would be more than offset by the costs of the additional Mk41 systems and integration work.
The FMS has a capacity of approximately 385m3 and is designed to hold up to 150 tonnes of containers or equipment. The empty weight of an 8-cell strike-length Mk41 module is about 15 tonnes, totalling around 120 tonnes for 64 cells. Theoretically, if all 64 cells were filled with one of the heaviest effectors such as Tomahawk missiles this would add about 100 tonnes. This would likely require some reinforcement of the midships area to support the VLS foundations but the additional topweight consideration is relatively modest and BAES naval architects have clearly calculated it to be within safe limits. The 8 Harpoons (combined weight of about 6 tonnes) have been replaced with 16 NSMs (combined weight of about 7 tonnes).
Trading the mission bay for missiles may seem like a straight upgrade but the FMS has very significant utility, especially the ability to deploy a sophisticated array of autonomous systems that will have increasing importance in future naval warfare. The FMS’ full potential has not yet been fully explored and its removal priorities high-end punch over flexibility, especially for low and mid-range intensity warfare capabilities.
Adding VLS cells has little purpose if there are no weapons to fill the cells. In contrast to the RN, the RAN does at least have Mk 41 already in service and a stock of compatible missiles. However, the recent DSR noted Australia’s overall lack of munitions and the need to invest in substantial new stocks. Sadly, the world appears to be lurching towards greater confrontation, with rising tensions in Asia, the Middle East and the war in Ukraine now is a very good time to be a missile manufacturer. For example, Japan has just placed an order for 400 Tomahawks in a $2.35 billion deal and the Netherlands is also in the queue for TLAM. The Norwegian Naval Strike Missile has recently become a runaway export success with many NATO and aligned navies in line to buy. In general, complex weapons remain expensive, even if purchased in bulk and maxed-out manufacturing capacity suggesting there will be a long lead time for some weapon deliveries.
Type 83 candidate?
The RN has begun the concept phase for the Future Air Dominance System (FADS) to provide air and missile defence for the fleet, essentially replacing the Type 45 destroyers. FADS is a broad-ranging concept that adopts a ‘systems-of-systems’ approach and may not result in the capability being centred on just a single surface combatant type. Depending on your point of view, this is either innovation at the bleeding edge or an attempt to save the cost of building expensive AAW destroyers/cruisers like every other serious navy. The ‘ship’ element of FADS will be the Type 83 destroyer but its size and capability its undefined at present. The Type 26 GMF proposal potentially offers a simpler route for the RN to obtain a powerful conventional air defence platform. The obvious advantage would be that Type 83 could have much commonality with Type 26 resulting in huge savings in design effort, time, capital and through-life support costs. Construction in Glasgow could follow seamlessly from HMS London to the first Type 83 and could deliver ships ready to replace the Type 45s in the late 2030s.
The RN already seems set on adopting Mk 41, having selected it for Type 26 and Type 31 and looks likely to abandon the Sylver VLS system. Just how much further the RN may go down the US equipment route is a long and complicated discussion beyond the scope of this article. Standard missiles or an iteration of Aster? UK combat system or Aegis? How much anti-ballistic missile capability is needed? etc. One contentious aspect would be the primary radar selection, given the exceptional performance of the UK-designed Sampson MFR placed very high on the Type 45’s mainmast. In 2017 the MoD announced it would evaluate CEAFAR for future combatants but it’s hard to believe that a ‘son of Sampson’ would not be the preferred option for Type 83 both for capability and sovereign design/manufacturing reasons.
While the Type 26 GFM is not a panacea, and like all warships involve design compromises, it appears to be a very attractive option for the RAN to meet its pressing need for greater firepower. For the RN (and the Royal Canadian Navy) it may also offer important new possibilities.
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